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Summary
This article deals with the impact of a decree passed by the Communist International
in Moscow in 1928. It shows how it influenced not only the most important com-
munist party outside the Soviet Union at that time, namely the German Communist
Party, but also the smallest, the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), both of
which were hampered by the rigid doctrinaire beliefs forced upon them by Stalin via
the Comintern. The paper argues that the CPSA would have been more successful if
it had listened to the views of some black party members. This might have shortened
its long period in the political wilderness.
Die uitgebreide invloed van die 1928 dekreet van die
Kommunistiese Internasionale
Hierdie artikel behandel die inpak van ’n dekreet deur die Kommunistiese Interna-
sionale (Komintern) in Moskou gedurende 1928. Dit bespreek die invloed op die
belangrikste kommunistiese party van daardie tyd buite die Soviet Unie, naamlik
die Duitse Kommunistiese Party, maar ook die kleinste, die Kommunistiese Party
van Suid-Afrika (KPSA). Beide is gekortwiek deur die rigiede doktrinêre idees wat
via die Komintern deur Stalin op hulle afgeforseer is. Daar word geargumenteer dat
die KPSA meer suksesvol sou gewees het indien hulle na die menings van sommige
van die swart partylede sou geluister het. Dit kon die tydperk wat die KPSA in die
politieke wildernis deurgebring het, aansienlik verkort het.
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This article deals with the context and the results of a decreepassed by the Communist International (Comintern) in 1928.There was, of course, a multiplicity of causes shaping the
events of the time, in both Germany and South Africa, the two coun-
tries examined in this article. Emphasis is placed on one particular
cause here in order to give it its rigthful place in the sequence of
events. The writing of much of the period’s history, particularly in
the case of the Communist movement in South Africa, occurred be-
fore the opening of the Comintern Archives in Moscow and it is ho-
ped that this new information will augment present-day knowledge
of the events of the time.
The Bolshevik Revolution took place in 1917. By 1921 the small
communist movements throughout the world had affiliated them-
selves to the Comintern. At that time, it appeared perfectly obvious
that the Bolsheviks held the key to the success of the communist
movement. They had triumphed in Russia and it seemed that other
communist parties which correctly followed their Bolshevik policies
would be successful. The assumption was that the Bolsheviks must
be right, because they alone had carried through a successful socialist
revolution. By the tenth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in
1927, however, the Comintern had not succeeded in spreading the
communist revolution to other parts of the world. By 1921, Lenin
had already reluctantly come to the conclusion that joint action, pre-
ferably only with the socialist rank and file but for a period also with
socialist leaders, was a necessity.1
At that time it seemed that unless a connection could be made and,
more importantly, maintained with numerically better-supported
movements of the left, communists would never come to power. The
tactic which they employed from 1921 until 1928 was thus to gain
political influence by establishing ties with the Labour Party or the
social democrats. However, not only the European parties, but also
Asian and South African parties affiliated to the Comintern had been
unsuccessful in establishing direct connections with leftist movements
on a permanent basis. New tactics were thus called for, ones that would
1 K McDermott & J Agnew, The Comintern, a history of international communism
from Lenin to Stalin. London: MacMillan, 1996: 6-8, 27, 45.
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have to result from some drastic rethinking, if they were to be any
more successful than the failed joint tactics. It was this failure that
propelled the endeavours of the Comintern for the next five years.
Nikolai Bukharin, Chairman of the Comintern, and his support-
ers had been committed to joint action. This policy changed after
they lost influence, and by 1928, a year after the tenth anniversary of
the Russian Revolution, a new policy had come into force. Action
with other, more powerful organisations, putting members of the
party into such organisations and forming organisations with those
who were not party members, the policy favoured by Bukharin had
undoubtedly failed by 1928, which now became unacceptable. It
was, in any case, not the way the Bolsheviks had gained control of
Russia. The new policy to be followed the one which had succeeded
at the time of the Russian Revolution. This was an acknowledgment
that it was the unique characteristics of the Bolshevik Party that had
enabled it to triumph in the Russian revolution.2
The idea of joint action, although dropped in 1928, was later to
prove the most consistent method used by the communists to further
their aims. When the method resurfaced in 1934 it became known
as the “united front”. The word “front”, in this context, can have two
meanings. One is that of a unity between disparate elements against
the common enemy. The other meaning is that of a pretext, a false fa-
çade. The first meaning was presented to the world by the Party, but
the second was the reality.
The method used during the 1921-1927 period was that of ma-
king use of front organisations which were formed as part of Comin-
tern directives from Moscow. The purpose of a front organisation was
to form a movement that would give the appearance of being an in-
dependent, spontaneously created organisation. The chairman of
such an organisation would not be a party member or, at most, a
clandestine member, or one they believed to have left the party. Be-
hind the notion of the united front lay the realisation, at a very early
stage in the history of the twentieth-century communist movement,
2 D Hallas, The Comintern. London: Methuen, 1985: 49; H Haywood, Black Bol-
shevik. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978: 228; 230, 235ff, 262, 270,
272.
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that the mass of organised workers remained committed to their re-
formist organisations.
By 1928, the Comintern had already assumed its air of invincibi-
lity and was not ready to acknowledge that its previous policy had
been a failure. It continued to maintain that it was still in favour of
joint action, but now called this a united front from below. This sim-
ply meant that communist parties were to encourage members of
other organisations to join them, something that they should have
been doing all along in any case.3
Initially, the Comintern was a genuinely international communist
organisation. In spite of being based in the USSR, it could and did
exercise autonomy of action. However, when the 1921-1927 directive
failed, the end of Comintern autonomy was signalled. Communist
strategies after this were elaborated in the Kremlin and distributed
throughout the International by the Russian-dominated Executive
Committee of the Communist International (ECCI).
The following five years (1928-1933) saw the promotion of the
independent identity of the communist party as a distinct and sepa-
rate entity. No form of co-operation between communist parties and
other political organisations was now permissible.4
This decree was personally promoted by Stalin and first made its
appearance at the Sixth World Congress in July-August 1928. At
that time, there was an economic boom in the USA, hardly a sign of
capitulation on the part of capitalism. However, by 1930, the whole
world except for the USSR was in a slump. This contrast enormously
reinforced Stalin’s authority and, with it, the 1928 directive.5
At that time, the most important parties of the left in European
politics, directly in competition with the communists, were the so-
cial democrats. Not only did they retain working-class support, but
3 J Ngubane, An African explains apartheid. London: Pall Mall, 1963: 183; SAIRR,
Ad 2182, The communist bogey, League for the Maintenance of Democracy.
Cape Town: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1946; McDermott &
Agnew, The Comintern, 1996: 28.
4 McDermott & Agnew, The Comintern, 1996: 68, 73.
5 Hallas, The Comintern, 1985: 106-7; 126, 136; G Padmore, Britain’s third em-
pire. London: Dobson, 1959: 327.
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also the most important of these parties, the Sozialistische Partei Deutsch-
land (SPD) of Germany, was committed to a Western-orientated fo-
reign policy. To discredit them, the communists from then on descri-
bed them as social fascists, maintaining that they were worse than the
Nazis.6
However, the Comintern advocated the same tactics throughout
the world in this period. It was immaterial whether the discussion
involved the largest communist party in the world after the Soviet
Union, namely that of Germany, or probably the smallest, that at the
furthest tip of the African continent, the Communist Party of South
Africa (CPSA).
In South Africa there were no social democrats to oppose. The
only possible parliamentary party with which the CPSA could align
was the South African Labour Party. By 1924, however, that party
had completely rejected the communists by entering into a pact with
J B M Hertzog’s National Party. The Comintern tactics remained the
same, but the strategy differed. In South Africa it centred on the
slogan “Native Republic”, with its accompaniment “Return the land
to the Natives”. This was the new method by which the Comintern
hoped to win over black South Africans to the communist cause. In
spite of a great deal of later discussion about what this slogan meant,
it appears that its meaning was perfectly clear in 1928. It meant a
republic controlled by the South African black majority, and had
nothing to do with the class struggle. Both S P Bunting, CPSA
chairman at that time, and George Padmore, an Afro-American com-
munist who worked in Moscow when the theory first made its appea-
rance, agreed on its meaning. They held that the Comintern had
switched its South African tactics from a class struggle to a race
struggle.7 Whatever its trappings, the root of the decree was the pro-
hibition of fraternisation with other political organisations. Both the
German and the South African communists had to go it alone.
6 Mc Dermott & Agnew, The Comintern, 1996: 87-8.
7 University of the Witwatersrand, A949 Bunting Articles, E Roux to V Dachin,
6.3.29; Ibid, A949, “The new slogan and the revolutionary movement among
white workers in South Africa”, Eddie Roux; P van Dumm, “Class struggle, race
emancipation of national liberation, the communist movement in South Africa
and the Comintern”. Unpubl speech at the Africa Institute, Moscow, 1993: 20ff.
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Given the insignificance of most of the communist parties then
affiliated to the Comintern, the decree was naturally accepted under
protest, and various communist parties world-wide attempted to mo-
dify it. Its adoption caused a severe drop in membership in all coun-
tries except Germany. The perception that it had succeeded in South
Africa because it “had a new partly black leadership [and] it was able
to lead a number of strikes and gain influence in spite of repression”
later proved incorrect.8
Resistance to these instructions from the Comintern was wide-
spread, particularly in the European communist parties. At the local
level, enthusiasm for the united front continued to be displayed
among the Berlin district party leadership, for example, in spite of
their being severely reprimanded for this. There were other examples
of this kind of fraternisation between the communists and the social
democrats in Germany, but they all came to naught because the lea-
dership was firmly under the authority of the Comintern. The new
tactics meant open opposition to the Social Democrats. In October
1927, French communists, who had in previous elections voted for
Socialist Party candidates in order to defeat the right-wing bloc, were
now forced to split the leftist vote by putting up their own candi-
dates. The decree thus successfully split the leftist vote and weakened
it significantly. British communists also opposed the decree on the
grounds that it would play into the hands of the Conservatives. It
was not until 1929 that the opposition to the decree in the British
Communist Party was overcome and the new tactics finally accepted.
Initially, the peculiar circumstances of German politics made it
seem as if the go-it-alone decree had been successful there. The KPD
(Kommunistische Partei Deutschland) share of the votes increased steadi-
ly from May 1929 to November 1932. In November 1932 the Nazis
won the German election with 33.1% of the votes. The Social Demo-
cratic Party (SPD) won 20.4% and the communists 16.9%. Thus
even as late as 1932, a vigorous united front policy on the part of the
KPD could have garnered more votes than the Nazis. Stalin’s Com-
intern ensured that they did not pursue such a policy. On 13th Sep-
tember 1932, the communists presented a vote of no confidence in the
8 Hallas, The Comintern, 1985: 130.
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Von Papen government. They were supported by the Nazis. The
Chancellor was deposed and the way was open for Hitler to become
Chancellor of Germany. Had the communists continued to pursue
their former tactics of a united front with other parties of the left, they
would not have joined the Nazis in this crucial vote.9
The KPD had been for many years the pre-eminent hope for the
installation of Marxist socialism in a western country.10 Because of
the divisive tactics imposed on the KPD by the Comintern, an anti-
fascist front with the social democrats proved impossible. This left
the way open for Hitler, despite the electoral strength of the left-
wing parties. It is true that the SPD harboured a deep antipathy
towards Bolshevism, but the tactics pursued by the KPD after the
Comintern Decree inevitably led to a split in the votes for the leftist
parties. Although an outright alliance would have been difficult, in
spite of opinions to the contrary, splitting the vote was undoubtedly
of advantage to the Nazi Party. The question of Stalin’s role in the
Nazi’s rise to power has generated a great deal of historical debate.
An American expert on the topic, Robert C Tucker, holds that by
[f]orcing upon the KPD a policy of uncompromising belligerence
against Social Democracy [social fascism], he [Stalin] abetted the
Nazi victory […] insofar as the possibility existed of heading off
this event by encouraging a united front of the German left and
other anti-Nazi forces, he was chiefly responsible for its failure to
materialize.11
It was only in March 1933, literally hours before the KPD was
declared illegal, that Moscow unenthusiastically considered the esta-
blishment of a united front with the social democrats. This overture
was (not entirely surprisingly) rebuffed by the social democrats, still
smarting from their designation as “social fascists”. Once Hitler as-
9 P Johnson, A history of the modern world, from 1917 to the 1980s. London: Wei-
denfeld and Nicholson, 1984: 280-1; A Bullock, A study in tyranny. Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1986: 109-10, 112-3, 230-1; McDermott & Agnew, The Com-
intern, 1996: 73-4.
10 D P Hornstein, Arthur Ewart, a life for the Comintern. London: Hutchinson,
1993: 157, 159-60, 169-70, 187; Hallas, The Comintern, 1985: 136.
11 R C Tucker, Stalin in power: the Revolution from above, 1928-1941. New York:
Redcliffe, 1992: 225-32, quoted in McDermott & Agnew, The Comintern, 1996:
116.
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sumed the chancellorship in January 1933, Nazi control over Ger-
man society and government succeeded so readily because there was
no organised opposition. At least part of the blame for this state of
affairs can be attributed to the disastrous Comintern directive.
In spite of all this, at the meeting of the Comintern ECCI held in
November 1933, there was no criticism of the disastrous policies
pursued in Germany as dictated to the German party by the Comin-
tern. In fact those among the German communists who had advoca-
ted joint action with the socialists to defeat the Nazis continued to
be denounced as traitors. This slavish obedience to the directive of
the Comintern is borne out by much documentary evidence. By for-
cing upon the KPD a policy of uncompromising belligerence against
the social democrats, Stalin aided the Nazi victory. The anti-Social
Democratic stance of the KPD was at times translated into joint
action with the Nazis, the two most notorious examples being the
Prussian referendum of 1931 and the Berlin transport workers’ strike
of November 1932. In 1933 Zinoviev went so far as to state that
Stalin was responsible for Hitler’s victory, perhaps an unwise com-
ment but certainly at least partially true.12
However, in the Comintern, even at the end of 1933, at the 13th
ECCI Plenum, they were still attacking the social democrats. It took
until February 1934, when the French communists for the first time
ignored the Comintern decree, and united with the socialists. These
events were among the aspects analysed by Georgi Dimitrov, the
Bulgarian communist whose contribution to the Reichstag fire made
him a hero in the Soviet Union. By then Stalin himself clearly reali-
sed that his policy had failed. With Stalin’s blessing (the only caveat
being that they should not implicate Stalin himself in the policy
change), Dimitrov demolished the policy of the past four years. The
period of going-it-alone was over.13
12 Bullock, A study in tyranny, 1986: 112, 116, 118, 122; Hornstein, Arthur
Ewart, A life for the Comintern, 1993: 157, 159-60, 169-70, 187; Hallas, The
Comintern, 1985: 136; D Orlow, The history of the Nazi party: 1933. Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh, 1973: 23-4.
13 Bullock, A study in tyranny, 1986: 124-5.
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By that time the Communist parties of Europe were in disarray
and Hitler was firmly in power in Germany. However, the repercus-
sion of the failure were also felt in the Soviet Union. Stalin’s purges
of the 1930s have been portrayed as the unreasonable actions of an
evil despot. Very few attempts have been made to see his actions as a
logical, if extreme reaction to the circumstances of the time. After
1933, Stalin began to believe that the Comintern was a hotbed of
spies. This was not a totally unwarranted assumption. There was
some leakage of Comintern activities. For example the executions of
three members of the Communist Party in South Africa, Lazar Bach
and Maurice and Paul Richter, were reported at that time in the
South African press. The fact that a black CPSA activist, Josie
Mpama, gave evidence at the commission appointed to investigate
the South African party (CPSA) in the name of “Henderson”, was also
known to the South African government.
So even in the case of a small and insignificant party like the CPSA
the government could obtain information about what was going on in
Moscow. There were thus some leaks, probably through the British
Communist Party. The singular lack of success of the parties that had
affiliated to the Comintern, in contrast to the success of the Bolshevik
party in Russia, may have seemed incomprehensible to Stalin, unless
the Comintern was, as he thought, riddled with spies.14
The CPSA in South Africa was of course given a similar directive.
The difference between the European parties and the CPSA was that by
1928 the only organisations that were still co-operating with the CPSA
were black political organisations. The party members who protested at
the Comintern prohibition against co-operating with other political
organisations were, with two exceptions, all black.
From 1924 the CPSA had concentrated on the national liberation
of blacks. As previously mentioned, by that date its only possible ally
in white politics, the South African Labour Party, had rejected its
overtures. The new 1924 policy directives from the Comintern co-
incided with this rejection and the emphasis was now placed on form-
14 Moscow, Comintern Archives (hereafter CA) 495/14/354/14, Cutting on the
deaths of Lazar Bach and Paul and Maurice Richter, Sunday Express, July 18,
1937; CA 495/1/349.
ing a united front with the only two black organisations of any sig-
nificance in the country at that time, namely the Industrial and Com-
mercial Workers’ Union (ICU) and the ANC. All-out efforts were then
made by the CPSA chairman, Sidney Bunting, to ensure that the
CPSA played a significant role in both these organisations. Unfortu-
nately for him, the ICU expelled its communist members in 1926 and
the alliance with the ANC eventually fared no better.
The new directive of 1928 was officially adopted by the CPSA in
January 1929. It maintained the 1924 emphasis on supporting the
national liberation of blacks but, as in Europe, forbade co-operation
with other organisations. The new directive emphasised liberation, as
its name, “Native Republic”, indicated.
The impossibility of carrying out the directive was immediately
apparent to Sidney Bunting. He was fully aware of the extremely
small and powerless status of the party. The CPSA needed to align it-
self with other organisations if it was to have any influence at all.
Unfortunately by 1930 the CPSA had also been ousted from the
ANC. The attempt at organising its own black trade union move-
ment, the Federation of African Trade Unions, had failed, the Fede-
ration remaining weak and ineffectual, as Bunting himself admitted.
Certainly the Comintern was right in thinking that its previous stra-
tegy had not succeeded in South Africa and that a new directive was
called for. Bunting, however, was also correct when he maintained
that the Comintern’s new directive would not work in South Africa.
He did not think that they should abandon joint action, in spite of
its lack of success.
Understandably, the Comintern believed that the South African
communists were unwilling to carry out its directive. This was true
of Sydney Bunting, the Party chairman. Bunting was thus expelled
in 1931. The Comintern expelled many others along with Bunting,
those regarded as lacking in commitment to the new tactics. The
blacks they expelled were among those who had aided Bunting, some
in giving the Comintern false information on his successes, in an at-
tempt to prevent the decree from being adopted in South Africa. For
example, his hastily assembled Federation of Trade Unions was found
to be a “paper organisation “ by the Comintern. Bunting then tried
to ingratiate himself with the Comintern by busying himself, during
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the course of 1931, with the successful organisation of mine workers.
This “success” also turned out to be fraudulent.
After the expulsions, the Party realised it had no choice. Part of
the new directive, as far as South Africa was concerned, meant that
there was now an emphasis on the training of blacks in the Soviet
Union as party activists. Those blacks who went to Moscow at this
time were probably initially enthusiastic about the new slogan.
However, it was evident to the Comintern that what appealed to
them were the nationalistic aspects of the “Native Republic” slogan. 
Moses Kotane was one of those who initially gave his unqualified
support to the slogan. Otherwise, he would not have been sent for
training to Russia. In spite of this training, however, he seemed beset
with difficulties in carrying out his instructions after his return. This
was because it was impossible to carry out in practice in South Africa,
although the underlying theoretical basis of a country under black
control, as “The Native Republic” slogan suggested, was appealing. 
Kotane had done well in Moscow and, on his return, was imme-
diately made party secretary, the highest position to which a black
party member could then aspire. Kotane was party secretary for only
a few months, however, when the Comintern ordered his removal,
presumably because he was not conforming to the decree.
Kotane had expressed unhappiness with the aspect of the decree
that prohibited co-operation between the CPSA and other black or-
ganisations. He was against the party’s continual denigration of the
leaders of the successful protest organisations, which were now frown-
ed upon, like the social democrats in Germany. This was not because
Kotane personally had any great respect for such activists, but because
he thought that the CPSA would lose support if it held such views.
Black activists outside the party were more successful in gaining mass
support than activists within the party, and denigrating them would
not, in Kotane’s view, gain the CPSA any adherents.
After his demotion, Kotane was made a party organiser in Johan-
nesburg. However, he left Johannesburg and his new, less prestigious,
position without party permission and moved to Cape Town. There,
with other disaffected members of the party, like Jimmy La Guma and
Johnny Gomas, he started a national liberation movement. This had
initially been a part of Comintern strategy for the “Native Republic”
slogan, but had been dropped at the insistence of Bunting. To what
extent this National Liberation League (as it was called) would have
been similar to the initial idea of the Comintern is not certain. Never-
theless, its decision to prohibit whites from becoming members of the
League was not to the Comintern’s liking, nor was its ready acceptance
of Trotskyites among its leaders. White members of the party were ef-
fectively prevented from having any say in the National Liberation
League. Whatever the National Liberation League purported to be, it
was not class-based.
As the party leaders were always white, such attempts by black
activists might be viewed as racist. Later, at the Commission of In-
quiry in Moscow in 1936, Kotane was labelled a racist for his views.
However, it would be more accurate to see it as an attempt by the
black activists of the CPSA to achieve some kind of local autonomy
from centralised party rule. The organisation that they formed was
the only way in which they could assert themselves. By denying
membership to whites, they effectively excluded the party bosses.
The inclusion of dissident elements like the Trotskyites was definite-
ly against party tactics and specifically against the decree that prohi-
bited interaction with other organisations.
Most of the black activists, including Johnny Gomas and Jimmy
La Guma, appeared to support Kotane’s initiative. The only excep-
tions were J B Marks and Edwin Mofutsanyana. Their lack of support
was more a sign of internal party politics than of any ideological dif-
ference. Marks had been party secretary for a few months before the
return of Kotane and had lost his position to him. There always seem-
ed to be a certain amount of rivalry between them. Mofutsanyana was
appointed to the obviously coveted position after Kotane. In 1937
Mofutsanyana was, in turn, castigated for his “nationalistic” views, so
it is unlikely that he was against Kotane on principle alone.
Kotane, Gomas and Eddie Roux held the united front tactic to be
correct and were against the decree. Their revolt, however, was five
years down the line and thus overlapped with the realisation in the
Comintern itself that the decree had been a mistake. The protests of
the South African comrades were not against the idea of a native
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republic but directed at the fact that this had to be implemented
without the aid of non-Party members.
The formation of the National Liberation League led to the expul-
sion of Kotane and his supporters, including Eddie Roux, from the
Political Bureau of the CPSA. They, in turn, threatened to inform the
Comintern of the disastrous state into which the Party in South
Africa had fallen by 1934.15
Shortly after these events, in October 1934, Kotane wrote a letter
to the Comintern, to explain his reasons for forming a nationalist or-
ganisation with activists who were not members of the CPSA. He
held that the Comintern ideas on an independent native republic
would lead to the formation of a non-socialist, national state under
black control. This would then be followed by the second stage, that
of the workers’ and peasants’ republic, which would be a class-based,
socialist state. Although it was Kotane who wrote the letter to the
Comintern, these were probably the accepted views of the whole of the
factional section of the Party in 1934. The letter went unnoticed,
probably unread, and certainly unanswered. Kotane then left for Mos-
cow, uninvited, to present his views and those of the group which be-
came known in Moscow as the factional triumvirate. This was an extre-
mely unusual thing to do in 1935 when, it seems, the dangers of visit-
ing the Soviet Union were already known in South Africa.16
After the arrival of Kotane, all the influential members of the Par-
ty in South Africa were ordered to present themselves to the Comin-
tern to explain their actions. It is instructive how few of them did so.
Eddie Roux refused to go. Lazar Bach, an important member of the
party who had fostered the now doubtful decree, was warned not to
go by Max Joffe, a member of the CPSA secretariat. J B Marks
bungled his exit from South Africa and never arrived in Russia. The
15 CA 495/14/355, Report; CA 495/64/133, unsigned letter written in Johannes-
burg, 31/7/34; University of the Witwatersrand, A949, Bunting Papers, FS
/10340/10/24.8.28, 38th session, VI Congress; ibid, 23/7/28, ARB 3608, File
1103, Report on the Federation of Non-European Trade Unions, 7.2.29.
16 CA 495/14/355; A Drew (ed), South Africa’s radical tradition, a documentary his-
tory, 1 1907-1950. Cape Town: Bunchu Books, 1996: 217-24.
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Comintern suspected that he had done this on purpose because he,
too, knew of the dangers of visiting Moscow at this time.17
They were asked to present themselves in Moscow because the
Comintern had decided to appoint a commission of inquiry into the
activities of the CPSA. They hoped in this way to pinpoint and re-
move dissident elements. This action would remove responsibility
from the Comintern decrees and place the party’s problems squarely
on the shoulders of party members.18
At this stage, Kotane’s letter was at last read and appreciated,
particularly by Andre Marty, the French communist who headed the
commission. At this stage, the decree was no more, but its embarrass-
ing repercussions were still echoing among Comintern officials. Ko-
tane’s interpretation was extremely useful. It provided adequate
justification for both the “Native Republic” slogan and the “popular
front” strategies which followed. The actual cause of dissent, namely
the refusal to allow co-operation with other organisations, was ignored,
but again became acceptable practice after 1934. If Kotane’s
interpretation is followed, then one cannot state that the slogan was
withdrawn (showing that the Comintern had not erred in putting it
forward in the first place). On the contrary, it was still current. There
had merely been a shift of tactics in carrying it out. The eagerness of
the Comintern to accept this interpretation is readily understandable.
It was never willing to acknowledge its mistakes, always preferring to
put the blame on its functionaries.19
17 CA 495/14/158(71), 26.11.37, Minutes of the PB CPSA held at Johannesburg,
on Saturday June 12th 1937; CA 495/14/350, Report of a meeting of the Politi-
cal Bureau of the CPSA, Johannesburg, 11th June 1937; CA 49/14/350, Minutes
of a meeting held in the Johannesburg Offices at Party Headquarters, 9th August
1936; Drew, South Africa’s radical tradition, 1996: 245; CA 495/14/351/7, CPSA
Report.
18 CA 495/14/159 (311); CA 495/14/349(133); CA 495/14/349 (176), 15 March
1936.
19 CA 494/14/352, On the situation of the Communist Party of South Africa,
2.12.37; CA 495/14/360/23 Notes; CA 495/14/360,“The Boers and British im-
perialism in South Africa, 5/9/40”, Review of the theses of Comrade Potekhin;
Drew, South Africa’s radical tradition, 1996: 217-24.
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The commission’s work was twofold. On the one hand, those who
had faithfully carried out the now useless previous directive were of
no more use to the party and had to be removed. On the other hand,
there were those who had opposed the tactics of the previous direc-
tive, and whose views had now been vindicated by the new Comin-
tern decree, with whom it would be more difficult to deal. The new
decree was basically a return to the initial Comintern policy of 1921-
1927 when a “united front” with other, non-communist organisa-
tions had been held to be the correct way forward.
Since the expulsion of the party chairman, Sidney Bunting, who
had disregarded the slogan in 1931, emissaries from Moscow had
been sent out on a fairly regular basis. They came to the South Afri-
can party to assess its obedience to the Comintern and its success in
carrying out Comintern directives. In 1934, Lazar Bach was called to
Moscow, ostensibly for retraining. This was not necessarily sinister.
Douglas Wolton had gone for such training in 1930 and come back
to replace Bunting as party chairman. It merely meant that a party
leader needed extra training to administer the party in the way the
Comintern wished. Bach, however, was in Moscow when the disas-
trous results of the decree were becoming painfully apparent.
At the sittings of the commission, Bach was forced to admit to
faults for which he could hardly have been blamed, such as that he
had been against participation in the All African Convention (AAC).
The AAC only met in 1935, and Bach was in Moscow from 1934. Of
course now that he understood that this was what the new “line”
called for, he did his best to abide by it. Now the CPSA had to work
with the ANC and even the tribal chiefs could form part of the new
united front in South Africa. All this was in complete contradiction
of the Comintern’s previous policy, but unfortunately insufficient to
save his life.20
The commission decided that those who had adhered to the now
outdated “Native Republic” slogan were at fault. They were Lazar Bach,
Maurice and Paul Richter, Max Joffe and J B Marks. The conclusion of
20 CA 495/14/349, Meeting of the Commission on the South African question,
19th March 1936; CA 94/14/152(10), Memorandum on the South African
question, 1.2.36; CA 494/14/156, (32), Information.
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the commission was that Bach had played a major role in drawing up the
wrong line of the party, which was of course quite untrue, and that he
must be detained in the Soviet Union. All the people named as being at
fault had in fact faithfully followed the Comintern directive.
The summing up of the commission stated that the party had
ignored the ANC, ICU and the Afrikaner parliamentary opposition
under D F Malan. The 1928-1934 period had been totally against or-
ganisations such as represented by Malan, the ICU and the ANC.
Lazar Bach and the brothers, Paul and Maurice Richter, were mur-
dered in Russia. Kotane was permitted to go home, although some
members of the commission wanted to retain him in Moscow on the
grounds of his racist views. Another black South African who never
returned from Moscow was Albert Nzula. In 1929 he had been made
assistant secretary of the CPSA. This accorded with the new emphasis
on putting Africans into positions of authority in the party, a move
that was to be expected under the 1928 “Native Republic” slogan.
This was the first time any African had been given such a responsible
position in the party. Bunting, who was party chairman at this time,
was most unwilling to appoint Nzula and removed him at the first
opportunity. His excuse was that Nzula was drunk at CPSA meetings.
However, the Comintern emissary, although admitting that Nzula
did drink, said that Bunting had exaggerated in order to sack him.
When Douglas Wolton came back, Nzula was reappointed, this time
as secretary.21
In his period as assistant secretary Nzula wrote a letter on behalf
of the Political Bureau of the CPSA. The letter was very much in
favour of continuing co-operation with such organisations as the
ANC and the ICU. Whether these thoughts were his own or whether
he was prompted to write the letter by Bunting, who held similar
views, is not clear. That he was criticising the policy of the Comin-
tern is obvious and could not have gone down well in Moscow.
21 R Cohen, Albert Nzula: the road from Rouxville to Russia, unpubl article, 1978:
4-7; E Roux, S P Bunting, a political biography, Cape Town: Mayibuye Books, 1993:
134, 152.
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Nzula attended the ANC conference in April 1930, where he un-
successfully tried to ensure that Josiah Gumede retained the leader-
ship of the ANC. He also put forward a motion for affiliation of the
ANC to the Communist Party. This proposal was not well received
at the ANC conference and was probably even less well received in
Moscow when they found out about it. Motions to affiliate with the
ANC were as much against the 1928 decree as affiliation to the Social
Democrats was in Germany in 1930.
Nzula was made joint secretary of the League of African Rights. He
became secretary of the Federation of Non-European Trade Unions,
which the Comintern later found to be a “paper” organisation. In
1929, after the adoption of the “Native Republic” slogan by the party,
he eulogised the black nationalist movement, maintaining that both
the ICU Yase Natal and the Cape African Congress had revolutionary
potential. This, again, was not the correct attitude.
Initially black party members had little understanding of the
Comintern’s overwhelming influence on the CPSA and thought that
they were permitted to express their own opinions. Neither Nzula
nor other black party members appeared to understand that members
were not expected to express their own opinions but merely to voice
those of the Comintern. Both Nzula’s statements and all the above-
mentioned activities in which he participated, were wrong for the
1928-1934 period.22
In 1931 Nzula left South Africa, probably via Lourenço Marques.
He appears to have been the first to use this clandestine routs. The
CPSA had organised the route to get members whose passport appli-
cations were refused, as was the case with Nzula,23 out of the country.
22 CA 495/64/85/14, Reply to Political Letter of the Colonial Committee of the
CPGB by the Executive Bureau of the Communist Party (SA), 5 November
1929, signed by Albert Nzula; NTS 7215 60/326, Report on the 17th Annual
Meeting of the ANC, 4/4/29; Cohen, Albert Nzula: the road from Rouxville to
Russia, 1978: 7, 9, 12; Roux, S P Bunting, a political biography, 1944: 141.
23 NTS 7215 60/326, Memo on progress of Native agitation in the Union; NTS
27-7,43/301, From the Director of Native Labour to the Secretary of Native
Affairs, 26 June 1929.
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Nzula arrived in Moscow in August 1931. He was followed a
month later by Moses Kotane, after which J B Marks and Edwin Mo-
futsanyana arrived for training. They left a little later than he did but
all of them had returned by the end of 1933, Kotane apparently only
a month or two before Nzula’s death. They probably all knew what
had happened to Nzula.24
That Nzula was not permitted to go home is obvious. He arrived
in Moscow first and should have gone home first. That he stayed
because he was so valuable to the Comintern is not an acceptable ex-
planation. The material in his file in the Comintern archives does not
back up assertions that Nzula was on the Central Committee of the
Profintern, a member of the Executive Council of the Comintern, or
editor of the Negro Worker. He had no trade union experience at all
and his being made secretary of the Federation of African Trade
Unions was meaningless – he was one of many who became the “se-
cretary” of what was a communist “article organisation”. This fact
was known to the Comintern by 1931 and would not have stood him
in good stead.
It is also difficult to see how he could have been the editor of the
Negro Worker, as has been asserted. George Padmore writes that he
himself was the editor of the Negro Worker from its inception until it
ceased publication in August 1933. By January 1934, the Negro li-
beration movement had been liquidated, as Padmore put it. This was
the very month that Nzula died. Padmore says nothing about Nzula’s
taking over or even working with him. Padmore apparently only met
him once. In any case, Nzula had only finished his training course in
Moscow in late 1933, a month or two before his death. It is unlikely
that he would have been on the Executive Council of the Comintern,
an extremely important position, while he was still a student. The
students of the University of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) were
24 A Madolwana [F Meli], The communists and black liberation: on the Commu-
nist International (Comintern) and Sub-Saharan Africa in the inter-war period
(1919-1935), Unpubl PhD, Leipzig: University, 1987: 170; Cohen, Albert
Nzula: the road from Rouxville to Russia, 1978: 16; B Bunting, Moses Kotane.
Bellville: Mayibuye Books, 1998: 286; [sn], The South African Communist Party
65 years in the frontline of struggle. Cape Town: CPSA, [ca 1994]: 6ff.
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called in to support various factional fights in the Comintern and
sometimes asked their opinion. According to the Afro-American
Harry Haywood, who wrote about his experiences at KUTV, students
were not given positions of any authority. Perhaps another indication
that all was not well with Nzula’s standing in the party was his atten-
dance at KUTV. Nzula, unlike Kotane, Marks and Mofutsanyana,
was theoretically an important CPSA functionary by the time he was
sent to Moscow. In spite of his position in the South African Party,
namely as a member of its secretariat, he was sent to KUTV, not to
the Lenin School. Another member of the CPSA Secretariat, Lazar
Bach, was also sent to KUTV. If in good standing, such senior party
functionaries should have attended the more advanced Lenin School,
not KUTV.25
A Comintern file on Nzula appears to have been compiled in or-
der to counteract any “slanders” which might arise over his death. It
is noteworthy that it was thought necessary to counteract accusations
of foul play. If he really had been the incurable drunk that he had
been made out to be, the file should not have been necessary, as his
death by misadventure would have been no surprise to anyone. None
of the claims to the important positions he supposedly occupied in
Moscow are noted in this file. It seems that Nzula’s “errors” conti-
nued to haunt him in Moscow.26
There are a number of articles purporting to have been written by
Nzula in the Negro Worker, under the apparent pseudonym of Jackson.
These are puzzling, especially in the light of Padmore’s statement that
he only met Nzula once and the fact that he does not mention Nzula’s
extensive involvement in the very publication of which he, Padmore,
was the editor. The first article that Nzula wrote for the Negro Worker
appeared in February 1931, although he only reached Moscow in
August 1931. Seven articles were purportedly written by him during
25 CA 495/64/132/1-3, George Padmore to Rathbone, 9.1.34; Madolwana, 170,
172; H Haywood, Black Bolshevik, 1978: 254-6, 328, 329, 383; Cohen, Albert
Nzula: the road from Rouxville to Russia, 1978: 4, 7, 18, 19.
26 CA 532/4/439,“This is a school record of the Negro comrade of KUTV who
died. File for reference. You may need this in future to meet inquiries, perhaps
to overcome slanders”. I have been unable to ascertain the initials of Potekhin
and Zusmanovitch.
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these years. The sixth was written in May 1934, when not only Nzula,
but also the Negro Worker was dead, having ceased publication in
January 1934. The last article was said to have appeared in volume 5
of 1935, when even the slogan was dead.
It is unlikely that Nzula could have been an editor of the Negro
Worker. How he could have written articles and had them published
in a journal that had ceased publication is puzzling. Some of Nzula’s
work was said to have been done in conjunction with two Comintern
officials, Potekhin and Zusmanovitch. Both were removed when the
slogan changed, and it seems very likely that Nzula was as well.
We now know that Nzula’s activities in South Africa, in contrast
to those of the other black activists at KUTV, were against the
directives of the Comintern. It is very likely that the above incidents
were serious enough to have led to his death.
After the Commission of Inquiry had come to its conclusions, a new
Political Bureau was appointed. It officially expelled Bach, the Richter
brothers, Marks, and Joffe. Explanations given for the expulsion of
Joffe in 1937, centred on his having warned Bach not to go to Russia.
Although the warning turned out to be timely, it presumably showed
an unacceptable lack of faith in the Soviet Union. Marks was expelled
because he did not arrive in Moscow, as he had been instructed to do.
For the expulsion of Bach and the Richters, no excuses were apparently
necessary and none were given. Albert Nzula was not mentioned.
Although no direct order has been uncovered, it seems that all those
expelled for failing to adhere to the by then defunct 1928 directive,
except for Sydney Bunting, were readmitted to the party after the
conclusion of the Commission’s inquiries.27
Kotane and his allies were initially relatively leniently dealt with.
They were not expelled, but nor were they readmitted to the Political
Bureau. It seems that they were still viewed with some suspicion.
This is not surprising as they were the only ones who were prepared
to state that Comintern tactics had to change because of the conti-
nuing failure of its policies. Eddie Roux said openly, even if only at
a party meeting, that the Comintern line in South Africa had been a
27 CA 495/14/158(71), 26.11.37, Minutes of the PB CPSA held at Johannesburg, on
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mistake and that the new line was the result of this mistake. How-
ever, the fact that they were so widely supported and that their ideas
had become a part of the orthodoxy made it difficult to oust them
from the party without causing further ructions. All three were al-
lowed to form part of the Central Committee in 1937. In 1938 Eddie
Roux and Johnny Gomas also regained their position in the Political
Bureau. In spite of this show of acceptance the Comintern continued
to keep an eye on their activities.28
The ousting of Kotane as party secretary in 1933 had led to his
alienation from the CPSA. Perhaps it was hoped that reinstatement in
this position would win him back and cure him of any “factional” ten-
dencies. If so, it proved to be a shrewd move on the Comintern’s
part.29 At the same meeting at which Kotane was given back his posi-
tion of party secretary, in December 1938, Roux was ousted from the
Political Bureau. The instructions from the Comintern were that
Roux was to recant publicly at this meeting or be expelled, but was
to be given a chance to explain himself. By making Kotane party se-
cretary just as they removed Roux from the Political Bureau, they ef-
fectively divided the opposition at a crucial moment. By December
1940, the third member of the faction, Gomas, was no longer a mem-
ber of the Central Committee either and had lost all influence in the
CPSA. The fact that the factional struggle, as the dissent of Kotane
and the others was called, was not really over until Kotane was made
party secretary, shows the support that he had in the party.30
Saturday, 12th June 1937; CA 495/14/350, Report of a meeting of the Political
Bureau of the CPSA, Johannesburg, 11th June 1937; CA 49/14/350, Minutes of
a meeting held in the Johannesburg Offices at Party Headquarters, 9th August
1936; Drew, South Africa’s radical tradition, 1996: 245; CA 495/14/351/7, CPSA
Report.
28 CA 495/144/535; Freedom, May 1944.
29 M Basner, Am I an African? The political memoir of H M Basner. Johannesburg:
Witwatersrand University Press, 1993: 96; CA 495/17/ 360a /2, Colonial Com-
mittee, 21/2/39, p.6; CA 495/14/352,13/149, The inner Party situation in
South Africa, 7/11/37.
30 CA 495/14/349/192, Kotane Testimony before the Commission 19.3.36; CA
495/14/350/140,20.9.37; CA 495/14/355/70-162, Statement of Comrade Bas-
ner, November 5, 1937; CA 495/14/355,1938, Organisational position of the
Party; CA 495/14/352,13/149, The inner Party situation in South Africa,
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Moses Kotane, Jimmy La Guma, J B Marks, and Edwin Mofutsa-
nyana were members of the Central Committee at the dissolution of
the CPSA in 1950. The CPSA then went on to survive as an illegal
organisation. Kotane retained his position of general secretary until
his death in 1979. J B Marks, a faithful follower of Lazar Bach, who
had initially been demoted and suspended, went on in later years to
become party chairman.31
The new “line” as applied after 1934 was again the united front,
now called the “Programme of Action” in South Africa. From 1934
to date, the Communist Party in South Africa has never again tried
to go it alone.32
The emphasis of black party activists was on liberation rather than
on party ideology. They had difficulty in understanding the changes of
policy that emanated from the Comintern. Kotane’s visit to Moscow to
explain the position of the faction in 1936 shows that, at this time, he
did not quite appreciate the dangers of such an endeavour. His com-
plaints at the hearing indicate that he did not understand why the Par-
ty was no longer permitted to co-operate with, or render aid to, other
black organisations, as it had previously done.
The expulsions in terms of the 1928 decree got rid of some able
men like Gana Makabeni. Makabeni might have become a formi-
dable trade union leader had he remained in the party throughout the
period. He and the others were, it is true, readmitted after the decree
7/11/37; B Hirson, Yours for the union, class and community struggles in South Afri-
ca, 1930-1947. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1990: 100; D
Musson, Johnny Gomas 104; CA495/14/355,7.3.38, Statement of Comrade Bas-
ner, 5th November 1937; 495/14/352, On the situation of the Communist Par-
ty of South Africa, 2.12. 37; R J Bunche, An African American in South Africa.
Ed by R R Edgar. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1992: 57,
72, 194; W H Andrews, Diaries; Bunting, Moses Kotane, South African Revolu-
tionary, 1998: 98.
31 N Mandela, Nelson Mandela, the struggle is my life. Cape Town: Mayibuye Books,
1994: 32; Andrews, Diaries, National Day of Protest, 1950.Report, Issued by
the Secretary-General of the ANC, 26 July 1950; CA 495/64/81, undated and
unsigned.
32 CA 495/14/129(122), Report by Josie Mpama; CA 495/17/352, 15.3.37, Tasks
in South Africa, 8; Drew, South Africa’s radical tradition, 1996: 239.
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was dropped in the mid-1930s, but such actions led to many wasted
years of inactivity when men like him were hampered by their lack
of money and support.33
If the Communist Party in South Africa had then been given the
opportunity to follow its own path, and given the kind of help that
the Soviet Union gave black activists after 1950, the road to libera-
tion might have been very different. Kotane and his fellow activists
knew the way, but the leaders of the South African Communist Party
were too much in thrall to the Comintern to follow them.
The situation in Germany was a far more complex one and whether
or not Hitler would finally have come to power in Germany if the
German Communist Party had formed an alliance with the Social
Democrats we will never know. All that can be said is that the 1928,
decree played an important, but previously neglected, role in the
events that finally enabled the Nazis to come to power in Germany.
33 Bunche, An African American in South Africa, 1992: 189-90, 247, 252, 254,
354, n 47.
